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ABSTRACT
The field of global international relations remains to a great extent aspi-
rational and focussed on the critique of Western-centric perspectives 
or the appraisal of non-Western theories within their specific geograph-
ical and historical contexts. In this essay, we go a step further and trans-
pose a set of Caribbean-based theories that gained prominence in the 
1960s and 1970s to apply it to the study of China’s contemporary rela-
tions with the Caribbean Community, drawing broader implications for 
China’s Belt and Road Initiative. The Caribbean’s tradition of critical and 
radical thought raises important questions about continuing epistemic 
dependency, structural impediments to development in small and 
highly open states, and a number of unresolved issues relating to the 
postcolonial condition in former plantation societies. Drawing upon 
these insights, we contend that the expectations placed on the emerg-
ing ‘South–South’ link with China are easily overstated, given China’s 
elitist business-centric approach to development, the eschewing of 
participatory approaches in Sino–Caribbean ventures and the passive 
incorporation of the Caribbean into China’s global vision.
Introduction
What does it take for a field of studies to become ‘global’? The term is flexibly applied across 
disciplines, injecting research agendas with a veneer of timeliness yet often referring to a 
variety of things. One meaning has to do with the politics of knowledge creation, or who 
speaks. After decades of postcolonial critique, there exist today many disciplinary efforts to, 
more or less genuinely, ‘provincialise’ Western scholarship and recognise a diversity of voices 
and experiences from the South (Chakrabarty 1992). Disciplines such as anthropology and 
postcolonial literary theory pioneered this endeavour, taking into careful consideration 
non-Western canons and knowledges – although in the case of the first this interest was 
initially underpinned by Western imperialism and ‘scientific racism’. Anthropologists have 
more recently advanced important debates on positionality and critical reflectivity (Mullings 
2005), and increasingly turned the ethnographic lens towards multi-sited processes, trans-
national flows, and the interests and behaviours of powerful actors (Gilberthorpe and Rajak 
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2017). This has helped to unsettle the traditional hierarchy between the North as a site of 
knowledge production and the South as the ‘field’ of investigation. Even more recently, the 
agenda to challenge (Western) foundational assumptions, decentralise knowledge produc-
tion, and globalise ontologies from the South has also taken hold in the field of international 
relations (IR). Critical reflection on the racist and imperial lineage of the discipline has rep-
resented a first step in an aspirational transition towards a decolonised global IR that is 
founded on ‘pluralistic universalism’ and recognises difference, but ‘eschews exceptionalism’ 
(Acharya 2014, 649; see also Thakur, Davis, and Vale 2017).
In this call for ‘pluralistic universalism’, we identify a second meaning of ‘global’. This relates 
more specifically to the raison d’être of academic enquiry. Here, ‘global’ acts as the geographic 
twin of multidisciplinarity, calling for coordinated efforts to devise theories that travel across 
space, accounting for difference yet remaining useful and intelligible for a global audience 
concerned with convergence and comparison as much as with difference. This ‘global’ seeks 
to neutralise the inward-looking tendencies that characterise some area study approaches, 
while also avoiding the Earth-flattening narratives often espoused by globalo-optimists. The 
work of economic geographers who investigate the embeddedness of capitalism through 
variegated and multi-scalar manifestations exemplifies this approach (Zhang and Peck 2016). 
Development geographers also typically address the complex and contested grounding of 
global forces in various Southern – and increasingly Northern – geographies (Mawdsley 
2017). These geographic traditions show us that idiosyncrasy is not conflicted with compar-
ison, and that the local and the global can be studied in a dialectic manner.
Finally, the third related meaning of ‘global’ refers to the ontological and epistemological 
basis of the analytical endeavour. This is a ‘global’ that recognises a planetary scale of 
enquiry and that cautions against the prevalence of methodological nationalism in the social 
sciences. Examples abound also in the field of geography, where researchers scrutinise multi- 
scalar processes while challenging the ‘territorial trap’ of the nation-state (Agnew 1994). 
Some historians have also turned their attention towards the world history of certain com-
modities to examine the development of capitalist modernity through a multitude of inter-
connected sites and processes – an enterprise that, despite its contemporary appeal, can 
be traced back to Eric Williams’ study of sugar’s role in the inception of global capitalism 
(Williams 1984; Beckert 2014). Similarly, critical political economists, always more attentive 
to the struggles of the Global South than their mainstream peers, have rejected the meth-
odological nationalism of IR and international political economy (IPE), and transited towards 
a ‘global political economy’ (GPE) that calls into question the centrality of states, reinstates 
class analysis and is attentive to forces of planetary scale (Cammack 2007; Carroll, Gonzalez-
Vicente, and Jarvis 2019).
Following these three conceptualisations of the ‘global’, we contend that a truly global IR 
needs to globalise the production of knowledge, speak to a global audience and adopt a 
multi-scalar perspective that considers the planetary dimension of phenomena such as the 
world market or climate change. Thus, the agenda for global IR requires bringing critical 
Southern perspectives to bear on processes of planetary relevance. These perspectives and 
theories should be appraised as something more than insights into localised experiences 
and the psyche of the ‘other’. Rather, the Global South must constitute an essential departing 
point in the study of the globalised conditions of late capitalism.
To illustrate our propositions, we revisit the tradition of Critical Caribbean Development 
Thought (CCDT) and apply it to the study of China–Caribbean relations. By giving the main 
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stage to theorists from the region, we hope not only to capture the nuance of Sino–Caribbean 
relations but also to restore the work and spirit of scholars who were committed to empow-
ering the region’s capacity for agency and independent critical thought. CCDT offers a the-
oretically robust and politically empowering alternative to otherwise predominantly empirical 
accounts of the Caribbean’s relationship with China, raising important questions about con-
tinuing epistemic dependency, structural impediments to development in small and highly 
open states, and a number of unresolved issues relating to the postcolonial condition in 
former plantation societies. Drawing upon these insights, we explain how the expectations 
placed on the emerging ‘South–South’ link with China are easily overstated, given China’s 
elitist business-centric approach to development, the eschewing of participatory approaches 
in Sino–Caribbean ventures, the ‘passive incorporation’ of the Caribbean into China’s global 
vision and the competitive pressures inherent to a consolidated world market.
The essay is organised as follows. The first section revisits the tradition of CCDT, with an 
explicit but not exclusive focus on the English-speaking Caribbean, and suggests updates 
that account for the transformation of the global economy since the 1980s. The second 
section introduces Sino–Caribbean relations. The remaining sections apply a series of the-
oretical and analytical CCDT insights into the analysis of Sino–Caribbean relations. We con-
clude by recapitulating the enduring relevance of CCDT in the context of global IR.
The emergence, decline and continued relevance of critical Caribbean 
development thought
The central position that the Caribbean occupied in the emergence of a global economy from 
the sixteenth century to the eighteenth explains how a region of its relatively small size (46 
million inhabitants today) became so influential, in both economic and intellectual terms. 
Caribbean sugar occupied in the eighteenth century the central place that steel and cotton 
would take over in the nineteenth century, and oil in the twentieth, mobilising financial, human 
and natural resources from three continents for European consumption and accumulation 
(Williams 1984, 121). The Caribbean plantation economies relied on a new kind of large-scale 
enslavement that ‘combined ancient forms of brutality with the quintessentially modern social 
form of value production’ (Anderson 2020). This system would in turn breed some of the 
world’s most influential anti-colonial thought. Thus, the region would become the setting for 
the modern world’s first successful anti-slavery uprising, in Haiti (1791–1803), home to some 
of the most influential revolutionary figures of the twentieth century, such as Marcus Garvey 
and Fidel Castro, and the birthplace of intellectuals who would lead debates on the colonial 
and postcolonial condition, such as Frantz Fanon, Norman Girvan, Stuart Hall, C. L. R. James, 
Claudia Jones, José Martí, George Padmore, Walter Rodney and Sylvia Wynter (Reddock 2014).
In this way, the Caribbean’s tradition of critical thinking on development emerged out of 
a broader effort to resist colonialism and racism – both understood as derivatives of capitalist 
exploitation (Henry 2001). Much of the progressive intellectual scholarship in the region was 
fuelled by, and had a symbiotic relationship with, radical projects in the 1960s and early 
1970s such as Rastafarianism, the Black Power Movement, socialism and the Third World’s 
quest for a New International Economic Order (Girvan 2010). As such, CCDT was part of a 
wider intellectual endeavour about the kind of social, economic and political order that 
should be pursued in the post-independence era (Girvan 2020). Inspired by these multiple 
movements, many Caribbean intellectuals shared a diagnosis for the underdevelopment of 
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the region, attributing Caribbean underdevelopment to the unequal relations emanating 
from the Caribbean’s passive insertion in the global economy. However, a schism emerged 
between those who proposed a complete overhaul of the capitalist system and those who 
ideated solutions within it (Best and Levitt 2009).
Carl Stone, Walter Rodney and C. y. Thomas were among the former. Their emphasis on 
class struggle resonated in the highly stratified Caribbean societies of the time, and their 
analysis of the unequal international division of labour in the postcolonial world gained adepts 
in the region and beyond – see for example Rodney’s How Europe Underdeveloped Africa 
(Rodney 1975, 2018; Stone 1983, 1986; Thomas 1986). Situated within the Marxist orthodoxy 
of the time – which identified imperialism as a high stage of capitalism (Lenin 1970) – these 
scholars understood that social development could only be realised if the existing economic 
system was replaced in its entirety (Bishop 2013; Stone 1986; Thomas 1986). Emerging in the 
1960s, the Plantation Economy School – espoused by intellectuals of the New World Group – 
shared the crux of the analysis, but sought to provide solutions suited to the peculiarities of 
Caribbean economies within the existing capitalist framework. Its key proponents included 
Lloyd Best, George Beckford, Kari Levitt, Norman Girvan and James Millette.
The Plantation School’s position became more prominent as the region gradually gained 
political independence. These scholars reassessed Arthur Lewis’ proposals to promote agri-
cultural productivity as a stepping stone towards the development of a competitive manu-
facturing sector (Lewis 1954). Contrary to Lewis, they maintained that the establishment of 
a free peasantry and the availability of surplus labour – which could facilitate diversification 
away from sugar production – was not enough to increase productive capacity and ‘break 
the traditional mercantilist links’ (Best and Levitt 2009, 196). The best lands remained largely 
in the plantation sector, the economy was managed from the metropole and the Caribbean 
maintained a role of ‘hinterlands – a source of material and produce and an outlet for final 
goods’ (Best and Levitt 2009, 198). Hence, while Lewis surmised that the Caribbean agricultural 
sector could mature sufficiently to transition industrially and technologically, scholars from 
the Plantation School were more sceptical. Lloyd Best disparagingly referred to Lewis’ pro-
posals as ‘industrialization by invitation’, given that Lewis’ model relied on foreign investment 
to accumulate capital for industrial transformation – even if Lewis saw the development of 
a local capitalist and professional class as the ‘ultimate key to the successful development of 
the Caribbean’ (Figueroa 2019, 12; see also Best and Levitt 2009). In short, whereas Lewis 
maintained that international trade and investment could kickstart the development process, 
the Plantation School saw in these links the very roots of underdevelopment.
The continued dependence on the plantation sector and other similarly foreign-controlled, 
natural resource-based and export-oriented sectors provided a good explanation of the 
external underpinnings of postcolonial underdevelopment (Girvan 2009). However, the 
Plantation School also explored how the dependent and exploitative ties with the metropole 
had shaped internal social, economic and political institutional arrangements that would 
persist after independence (Beckford 1972, xxii). Some of the most distinct contributions of 
CCDT coalesce in the dialectical relation between internal and external processes. Here, the 
idea of ‘epistemic dependency’ stands out. Epistemic dependency expands the analysis of 
dependency beyond the economic basis and espouses it also as a ‘syndrome in [the region’s] 
psychological makeup’ (Beckford 1972, 234–35). The idea resonates with Frantz Fanon’s under-
standing of national consciousness in the postcolonial world as a product of the local bour-
geoisie’s ‘intellectual laziness […], of its spiritual penury, and of the profoundly cosmopolitan 
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mould that its mind is set in’ (Fanon 2001, 119). From this perspective, independence had 
been a mere takeover of (neo)colonial administration as well as merchant and professional 
roles by local elites – or, in other words, little more than ‘flag independence’ (Barriteau 2007). 
As such, it remained constrained both by international economic hierarchies and by the 
region’s postcolonial inability to reimagine development independently.
Therefore, the first step towards an alternative regional vision was the development of 
independent Caribbean political thought (Best 1967; Northover and Crichlow 2005). The 
peculiar challenges of the region needed to be addressed, in particular its dependence due 
to its small size, high degree of openness and ties to former colonial powers. This dependence 
was seen to pervade various sectors of the economy. These included the monetary system, 
which depended on a metropolitan currency and a foreign-owned banking system; public 
financing, which was serviced by foreign loans and grants; and the extractive industries, 
which were at the mercy of multinational corporations that controlled the necessary tech-
nologies (Girvan 2010). In the immediate post-World War II period (1940s and 1950s), the 
Anglophone Caribbean followed Lewis’ proposals for industrialisation via foreign investment. 
This strategy yielded positive outcomes in growth and living standards, but failed to emerge 
as a self-sustaining formula for growth and socio-economic development (Keith and 
Keith 1992).
The Caribbean turned to import substitution industrialisation strategies in the 1960s and 
1970s, developing manufacturing bases in Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica and Barbados. 
However, local manufacturing was unable to tackle unemployment or to truly substitute 
imports (ECLAC 2000). Jamaica, under the leadership of Michael Manley and the People’s 
National Party, implemented a programme of democratic socialism in 1974, nationalising 
the bauxite sector and strengthening trade unions and worker rights (Stephens and Stephens 
2017). However, low economic productivity, external pressures (eg a CIA-led destabilization 
campaign) and the debt crisis of the 1980s would bring the experiment to a halt. ‘Cooperative 
socialism’ in Guyana under Forbes Burnhan had a similarly redistributive rhetoric, yet Stone 
(1986) has surmised that this model displayed more elements of economic nationalism than 
of actual socialism. The Grenada model of 1979 − 1983 exposed a more committed socialist 
orientation, as it included full worker participation in the management and profits of state 
and parastatal enterprises. It achieved massive improvements in social welfare programmes 
prior to the US invasion of 1983 (Stone 1986).
Some of the historical shocks sketched above – debt crisis, US interventions – would 
precipitate the decline of CCDT. Other dynamics were internal. Around the early 1970s, the 
New World Group split, and its members left in different directions (Meeks  2014). The schism 
between Marxist socialists and Plantation School scholars remain unresolved, with each 
group accusing the other of dependence on external influences, theoretical and method-
ological errors, and unrealistic expectations. As New World ideas gained popular acceptance 
in the revolutionary fervour of the 1970s, some intellectuals were drawn towards direct 
political action (Meeks 2014). Paradoxically, this meant that the group lost its scholarly com-
mitment. The rise of nationalism and the growing intolerance of some Caribbean govern-
ments also contributed to the New World group’s demise. Increasingly, nationalist leaders 
and university managers became wary of the group’s interference in national affairs, and 
promoted the ‘nationalisation’ of the staff of the individual campuses of The University of 
the West Indies. The latter gave rise to ‘new educated elites with a vested interest in insular 
nationhood’ (Girvan 2010, 11).
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The neoliberal turn in the global economy also adversely impacted the study of devel-
opment economics in the region (Girvan 2009, 2010; Levitt 2009; Meeks 2001; Henry 
2001). As state-driven development approaches declined in popularity, a new paradigm 
emerged in which the market became pre-eminent. While Trinidad continued to prosper 
in the 1980s from the 1970s oil boom, democratic socialism was crushed in Jamaica, 
Guyana’s version of socialism morphed into racially biased authoritarianism and the 
Grenadian experiment was aborted by US intervention. Academia, business and gov-
ernment shifted to survival mode. Training in political economy became subordinated 
to management education with a business-oriented mindset (Levitt 2009). By the early 
1990s neoliberal ideology had swept across the Caribbean, ‘whether by conviction’, 
force or the perception that there were no ‘viable alternatives’ (Levitt 2009, 192). Indeed, 
some authors within the region have carried the torch of critical scholarship to our days, 
for example Violet Eudine Barriteau, Anthony Bogues, Tennyson Joseph, Don Marshall, 
Patricia Northover and Rhoda Reddock. However, their most critical insights have 
often been sidelined in regional policy debates.
Despite its relative contemporary ostracism, CCDT remains relevant for a number of rea-
sons. The Caribbean’s increased participation in a globalised economy only emphasises 
Girvan’s note of caution about ‘the consequences of passive incorporation into the 
world economy’ (Girvan 2009, xxii). As noted above, such a mode of incorporation is both 
ideational and structural, and has as one of its corollaries the enduring hegemony of mer-
chant capital over production (Marshall 2002, 727). The structure of underdevelopment has, 
however, transformed. Hierarchies that were once international are today global, with states 
increasingly catering to transnational capital (Carroll, Gonzalez-Vicente, and Jarvis 2019). 
Here, the wider Caribbean region plays a dual role. On the one hand, the region is particularly 
vulnerable to the fluctuations of the global economy, as its economies remain heavily reliant 
‘on a narrow range of products and service markets’ despite the expansion of manufacturing 
in the mid-1970s (ECLAC 2000, 1). On the other hand, some Caribbean economies, and in 
particular British Overseas Territories, have become key anchors of the financialised and 
transnationalised (offshore) global economy. While some Caribbean professional elites have 
profited from this, the main beneficiaries remain in the transnational capitalist class rather 
than in the region’s majority.
The Caribbean participates today in a global economy that is more integrated than 
it was in the 1960s and 1970s (see ECLAC 2000). National development strategies are 
aligned to both World Trade Organization (WTO) obligations and bilateral partnerships, 
limiting the manoeuvring space. Therefore, while the underlying philosophy and general 
principles of CCDT continue to be relevant, references to these frameworks in discussing 
the Caribbean’s development challenges must necessarily take account of the new 
global environment. Here, without a doubt, the emergence of China as a key trade and 
investment partner, as well as a ‘development finance’ powerhouse, is of critical 
importance.
The Sino–Caribbean development nexus
The Caribbean, like most developing regions, felt the first shockwaves of China’s economic 
ascendance in indirect ways. Acutely decimated by two decades of neoliberal austerity, 
countries within the region that aspired to develop globally competitive manufacturing 
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bases saw those aspirations thwarted by China’s growing competitiveness since the 
1990s – while consumers in the region benefitted from access to cheap products imported 
from China. Additionally, economies with an abundance of natural resources found in China 
a market and a driver for high commodity prices during the 2003–2013 resource boom. 
With the exception of Cuba, which had developed important trade and investment relations 
with China following the collapse of the USSR in the early 1990s (Hearn 2012), most Caribbean 
economies started to develop more solid economic ties with the Asian country towards the 
late 2000s. Bilateral trade between the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and China was 
USD 3.4 billion in 2018 (Baksh et al. 2020), out of USD 46 billion of total CARICOM trade (UN 
Comtrade 2018). Today, investment (over USD 9 billion in CARICOM1) and finance (around 
USD 8.9 billion in loans to CARICOM countries) are the two most prominent vectors through 
which the People’s Republic of China (PRC) shapes the trajectory of Caribbean development.
We observe three types of Chinese investments in the Caribbean region, which may be 
accompanied by varying degrees of state financing. In the first group are companies that 
have a cumulative impact in the region’s economy. These companies invest in consolidated 
sectors such as tourism in Bahamas and Barbados, and in rising sectors such as the oil industry 
in Guyana. Their impact is cumulative in that they join other transnational investors and add 
on to existing trends within the region – although the initial investment may benefit from 
access to cheap credit from Chinese policy banks. In the second group are a number of 
Chinese businesses that invest in sunset industries. These companies have been able to cut 
managerial salaries and other production costs (see Lee 2017 on the austere ‘managerial 
ethos’ at Chinese companies in Zambia). In Jamaica, for example, Chinese investments of 
over USD 260 million helped to keep the country’s decaying sugar sector afloat for a number 
of years (more on this below).
Similarly, the Jiuquan Iron and Steel Company (JISCO) was able to bring Jamaica’s ALPART 
alumina processing plant back into businesses after it had lain abandoned for nine years. 
JISCO’s strategy included a reduction of costs in managerial salaries, the use of Chinese 
labour with different levels of qualification, and the increased casualisation of local labour, 
now hired under shorter term contracts with salaries that are lower than those received in 
2009. JISCO’s operations in Jamaica are also characterised by a distinct ‘logics of accumula-
tion’ (Lee 2017). As a state-owned enterprise that is not entirely liable to short-term share-
holder pressures for immediate profitability, JISCO has developed a plan to halt its operations 
since October 2019 in order to modernise the plant over a three-year period (Jamaica 
Observer 2019). The fact that a Chinese state-owned enterprise sees potential where others 
did not is related to the strategic status of aluminium in China, whereby its use value within 
the Chinese economy takes prevalence over the exchange value in international markets 
(Lu 2020). The case illustrates how, operating under an ‘encompassing accumulation’ logics 
(Lee 2017), Chinese investors can have a differential impact and boost economic activities 
that are otherwise unattractive to global private capital. However, serious questions remain 
about the developmental prospects of this and other investments, which have often been 
the target of complaints over labour exploitation and environmental and public health 
impacts.
The third type of Chinese investment involves a tandem of Chinese state finance and 
construction companies, and it is perhaps the most prominent in regional debates. Chinese 
construction companies made their first inroads in the region with the 2007 Cricket World 
Cup, when they helped to finance and construct or upgrade stadiums in Antigua and 
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Barbuda, Jamaica and Grenada (the latter amid diplomatic disputes with Taiwan). Chinese 
contractors have evolved from this niche and are now involved in expanding ports and 
airports (eg Antigua and Barbuda, Guyana), building roads (eg Bahamas, Jamaica), construct-
ing and rehabilitating hotels and resorts (eg Bahamas, Barbados, Guyana), developing gov-
ernment buildings and hospitals (eg Antigua and Barbuda, Trinidad and Tobago), erecting 
convention centres and auditoriums (eg Antigua and Barbuda, Guyana, Jamaica, Trinidad 
and Tobago), and planning industrial parks (eg Antigua, Jamaica and Trinidad). While a few 
companies have transited into private procurement, most of them operate within govern-
ment-to-government frameworks. These arrangements are characterised by close negotia-
tions between the Chinese and local governments, and involve a loan from a Chinese policy 
bank (usually at market rate; see Bräutigam and Gallagher 2014) to purchase the services of 
a Chinese state-owned contractor. Local governments provide sovereign guarantees for 
repayment, which reduces risks on the bank’s investment. In some cases, the loans can be 
paid for with commodities or public assets. This has been the case for Jamaica’s North–South 
highway, where a USD 457 million loan from the China Development Bank (CDB) was paid 
for with a 1200-acre land concession (Gonzalez-Vicente 2020).
These arrangements introduce a new ‘mechanism of accumulation’ in the region, depen-
dent not on global firms devoted to financial markets and shareholder value, but on the 
Chinese entrepreneurial state apparatus (Gonzalez-Vicente 2011, 2020). This mechanism has 
reactivated government spending in a region where many economies are crippled by high 
degrees of public debt (Rustomjee 2017). In turn, it has also opened debates about debt 
sustainability, and raised questions about the prices paid for projects that are not subject 
to open tenders. The answer to these questions depends on the capacity of Chinese infra-
structures to act as multipliers of economic activity, improve living standards for vulnerable 
and excluded populations, and respect the region’s natural wealth. From these various per-
spectives, Chinese investments have not significantly contributed to lifting the region from 
its developmental impasse, as we explain below. Moreover, while Chinese-financed infra-
structures do not require wholesale macroeconomic reform, as traditional multilateral lend-
ing does, they necessitate spaces of exception (Gonzalez-Vicente 2019). Throughout the 
region, governments have waived labour regulations and taxes in Chinese construction sites 
(Tudoroiu and Ramlogan 2020b). In these spaces of exception, Chinese contractors are often 
exempted from custom duties on machinery and operate with large contingents of Chinese 
workers who cannot join local independent unions and who are paid Chinese salaries in 
Chinese bank accounts.
Overall, while some of these trends may seem transformative, it is important to note that 
Chinese enterprises have readily engaged the region’s liberal regimes. At the same time, they 
have also deployed innovative mechanisms that expand markets and with them, inevitably, 
processes of uneven development. In what follows, we address four themes prevalent in CCDT 
in order to explain and theorise the underlying dynamics of Chinese capitalism in the region.
Epistemic dependency
From Fanon to Beckford, or Garvey to Best, Caribbean thinkers placed emancipated political 
thought at the centre of the struggle for postcolonial freedom. The question of epistemic 
dependency continues to burden regional politics – whether this is in the form of elevation 
of European cultural practices, or Washington’s tutelage over regional development policy 
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(Girvan 2012, 5). Within this context, the PRC’s engagement in the region has paradoxically 
restored political leeway to central government leaders while simultaneously contributing 
to undermine emancipatory development approaches. We identify three emerging trends 
associated with China’s engagement in the region: increased political manoeuvring space 
away from US and EU guidance, reinforcement of a narrow developmental trajectory, and 
weakening of social participation and subsequent consolidation of elite development 
thought (see Selwyn 2016).
Regarding the first of these trends, the introduction of Chinese finance in the region has 
allowed regional leaders to triangulate in search of better credit terms (Bernal 2016). The 
lack of macroeconomic conditionalities has turned many governments in the region towards 
Chinese banks, which have signed loans to CARICOM countries totalling around USD 8.9 
billion since 2000 (Minto 2019a). Regional politicians frequently contrast the flexible Chinese 
approach with the rigidity of International Monetary Fund (IMF) lending (The Daily Observer 
2014). Whereas Chinese banks also offer a fixed lending template, this is a template that in 
certain junctures suits the interests of regional economies better. Caribbean countries can 
now seek external finance without needing to embrace the wholesale neoliberalisation of 
their economies. This is not merely a minor victory, as conditional lending has been a major 
source of discontent in the region since the debt crisis of the early 1980s (Black 2001). 
Moreover, contrary to some commentary on China’s ‘debt trap diplomacy’, actual data sug-
gests that Chinese policy banks are relatively open to renegotiating lending terms in favour 
of the borrowing country – particularly when other sources of finance are available (Kratz, 
Feng, and Wright 2019). Therefore, loans that are part of broader infrastructure deals are 
now popular across the region – while also heatedly debated after leading to seven cancelled 
or stalled projects at a value of USD 4.2 billion (Minto 2019a, 153).
There are, however, limits to the flexibility of Chinese loans, and indeed to their role as 
catalysts for emancipatory development models. The region experiences already high 
degrees of liberalisation – particularly in terms of marketisation and openness to trade and 
investment. In this context, Chinese loans have not been used to roll back neoliberal reform 
but to honour existing debts and increase public spending on infrastructure. Infrastructural 
loans are destined for culture and leisure (eg cricket stadiums and convention centres), 
government buildings, a small number of medical facilities, or, more often, a wide array of 
projects that seek to enhance comparative advantages within a liberal market order. In the 
latter category we find transportation infrastructure, hotels and resorts, and a number of 
planned industrial parks and special economic zones in countries like Trinidad, Jamaica, and 
Antigua and Barbuda. In general, Chinese finance has allowed some regional economies to 
circumvent the liberalisation and ‘good governance’ agendas promoted by the IMF, World 
Bank or Inter-American Development Bank. However, countries in the region have fallen 
short of completing a post-liberal turn. This stands in relative contrast to countries such as 
Ecuador under Rafael Correa’s presidency. The latter galvanised Chinese loans to default on 
sovereign bonds in 2008 and pushed forward a post-liberal agenda that in its early days 
embraced elements of Andean indigenous understandings of the good life – even if failing 
to resolve key postcolonial and market inequalities (Gonzalez-Vicente 2017).
Chinese investments and finance are also limited in terms of content, and as such they 
foment a narrow developmental template. Here, it is important to note that the current wave 
of Chinese investments as part of the Belt and Road Initiative responds not to benevolent 
goals but to a crisis of overaccumulation in China’s construction sector (Gonzalez-Vicente 
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2019). Therefore, these investments are constrained to a limited number of sectors, and tend 
to emphasise infrastructural growth and natural resource exploitation. The most egregious 
example of the limits to this approach came in 2017, when news emerged that the CDB was 
helping the government of Grenada draft a national development strategy that involved 
the construction of a highway, a railway, a deep-water port, a wind farm and the moderni-
sation of the Maurice Bishop International Airport – as well as a call to take strong measures 
to protect the rights of foreign investors (Chen 2017). While Grenada’s Prime Minister would 
later clarify that other parties had also been approached and only China responded, and 
that eventually ‘any national plan will have to be endorsed by the people of the country’ 
(Barnacle News 2018), the case highlighted the enduring dependence on external models 
of development.
China’s engagement in the region has also narrowed the scope of social participation. 
Infrastructural agreements are reached in government-to-government negotiations and 
bypass open tenders. This has consolidated a model of top-down elite-led governance that 
eschews transparency and participation in terms of decision-making and scrutiny (Raymond 
2014). Projects are approved without standing the test of public deliberation, and as such 
they cannot serve as the basis for a truly emancipatory developmental paradigm. Some of 
the more recent plans to develop special economic zones with Chinese capital, such as the 
Phoenix Park in southern Trinidad, could indicate a resurgence of state economic planning. 
However, expectations still need to be matched by results, and there are major structural 
constraints that suggest success in these areas is unlikely (see below). Moreover, such success 
under the current socio-economic circumstances would produce very uneven forms of devel-
opment that would chiefly benefit transnational investors and local merchant capitalist elites.
In sum, a narrow developmental imaginary seems to coalesce when the capabilities and 
interests of Chinese investors are brought together with the constraints that local political 
and business elites face in envisioning long-term development goals. Girvan traced these 
constraints in Jamaica to the fact that the decades-long IMF control over economic policy 
had severely decimated the government’s capacity for autonomous planning (Girvan 2012). 
Other explanations can also be sought in the austerity measures that neoliberalised aca-
demia and pushed scholars and pundits to fund their research through consultancies to the 
World Bank, European Union and other agencies (Joseph  2017); in the immediate urgency 
for jobs and investment that tends to invite improvisation and hamper forward-looking 
strategies; or the prevalence of merchant capital and ‘conservative enterprise culture’ among 
local bourgeoisies (Marshall 2002, 747).
Passive incorporation
CCDT scholars have often remarked how the region was ‘passively incorporated’ into the 
international economy, a trend that is not divorced from the question of epistemic depen-
dency (Girvan 2009). Passive incorporation entailed a structurally subservient economic role 
during the colonial years, persisting economic dependency in the immediate postcolonial 
period, and extreme vulnerability in the world market amid high levels of liberalisation since 
the 1980s. Like other small states, Caribbean island states share a series of characteristics 
that exacerbate their vulnerability: small populations, limited human and natural resources, 
small physical and economic size, distance from international markets and a high level of 
openness. As a result, Caribbean economies find it difficult to cushion exogenous shocks, 
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such as external economic crises, natural disasters and climate change (IMF 2013). Whereas 
the nascent relation with China holds significant potential, several constraints block the 
region’s ability to fully harness these opportunities. In what follows we highlight three of 
these constraints: the exacerbation of production hierarchies and trade imbalances, the 
structural limitations associated to the types of Chinese investment available in the region, 
and the ways in which low transparency impedes an effective regulation of investment flows.
Within a global liberal economic order, economic development in China has tended 
to exacerbate international hierarchies of production and trade imbalances. This is due 
first of all to the gradual relocation of value chains to Asia, and secondly to the ways in 
which urban and industrial growth in Asia has increased the pressure on commodity 
consumption. In this context, trade between China and the Caribbean has risen expo-
nentially. Commodity exporters have enjoyed a growing demand for their products 
(Jamaica – aluminium oxide; Trinidad and Tobago – oil and gas; Suriname and Guyana – 
minerals and timber). Conversely, all Caribbean economies import finished manufactured 
goods from China, which has resulted in negative trade balances (Díaz 2016; Wenner and 
Clarke 2016). However, China cannot be seen as a buoyant ‘metropole’ in the classical 
dependency theory sense. Rather than unilaterally concentrating financial and industrial 
capacity, China has emerged instead a hub for transnationalised production (Gonzalez-
Vicente 2012), where a majority of the population endures in fact lower living standards 
than the citizens of many Caribbean countries. And yet, China’s key economic features – 
a huge low-wage labour force and a high demand for commodities for urbanisation and 
globalised production – have tended to crowd other developing economies out of man-
ufacturing sectors and push them further into a commodity-producing role (while some 
low-cost manufacturing has in recent years moved from China into South and 
Southeast Asia).
Under late capitalism, dependency is not international towards a defined set of countries, 
but global towards mobile flows of transnational capital. Nonetheless, under these new 
conditions, the structural burdens of the Caribbean remain disturbingly similar to those 
discussed by classical CCDT authors. The region faces high current account trade imbalances, 
resulting from a low level of diversification of markets and products (ECLAC 2018), an erosion 
of preferences for agricultural commodities and garment exports (Bishop et al. 2011), and 
some of the highest debt burdens in the world relative to economic size (ECLAC 2018). As 
Caribbean states have been categorised as middle-income economies (and above), some 
have graduated from bilateral and multilateral grants and other forms of concessional fund-
ing. High levels of poverty and income inequality persist despite good progress on human 
development (ECLAC 2018). This situation is compounded by the burdensome conditions 
for the repayment of international loans. More recently, the region has faced the threat of 
termination or restriction of correspondent banking services and their participation in the 
global banking system because of the perception of high risk associated with doing business 
with them (ECLAC 2018).
The focus of Chinese investments on infrastructures or consolidated sectors (natural 
resources or tourism) adds on to these trends. This was most acute in tourism-dependent 
countries in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis, whereas waning resource prices 
at the end of the 2003–2013 resource boom took a dent on commodity exporters (ECLAC 
2018; IDB 2018). Chinese investments and loans in infrastructure surpass other areas of 
development, with 18 out of 23 loans of China’s policy banks in the region concentrated 
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in this sector (Gallagher and Myers 2020). Without careful planning, large infrastructural 
projects will struggle to generate sufficient economic capacity to make up for a rising debt 
burden. With the possible exception of a number of yet-to-be realised industrial parks, 
Chinese infrastructural projects have not been focussed on the region’s key economic 
constraints, such as promoting production or integrating the region into economies 
of scale.
The questions of labour opportunities and technology transfer have also been points of 
contention. Traditional sectors such as natural resource extraction and tourism are renowned 
for creating a limited number of jobs or placing locals in low-skilled service roles, while the 
control of these industries is typically in the hands of foreign investors (Pattullo 2005). Adding 
to these trends is the fact that many Chinese construction projects rely on contingents of 
Chinese labour, limiting local employment opportunities. This has been deemed inimical 
for development, even if the ratio of Chinese and local labour is subject to negotiations, with 
those projects employing a higher percentage of local workers resulting in higher costs 
(Gonzalez-Vicente 2019).
Overall, there are serious concerns that Chinese firms may be undercutting national 
contractors thanks to a series of privileges, rather than to their inherent competitiveness 
(Kelly 2019). These include access to inexpensive credit, tax breaks and duty-free conces-
sions on equipment and materials, and exclusive access to cheap Chinese labour. The 
counterarguments here would be that infrastructures can improve productive capacity, 
and that the Chinese state has provided a number of scholarships for West Indians to 
pursue an education in the PRC. yet while improvements in logistics or skills training can 
indeed result in positive outcomes, the questions of foreign capital control and passive 
incorporation remain, while the Caribbean continues to endure one of the world’s highest 
levels of youth unemployment and emigration of tertiary-educated and skilled individuals 
(ECLAC 2018).
The (still) elusive quest for regional integration
The small size of Caribbean economies and the fragmentation of their approach to global 
challenges have traditionally worked to reinforce some of the trends described above. In 
particular, the inability to act as a market or institutional block weakens the region’s nego-
tiating capacity, impedes the development of economies of scale, and creates redundan-
cies in the public sector. Thereby, regional integration and cross-regional solidarity have 
been central to emancipatory agendas. However, Girvan’s (2011) concern about the sub-
ordination of regional interests to national priorities is evident in the CARICOM–China 
relationship, and particularly given China’s general avoidance of substantial regional agree-
ments, preference for bilateral relations, and eschewing of civil society participation.
The roots of the Caribbean regional integration project go back to various island feder-
ation attempts in the seventeenth century. The project regained traction in the twentieth 
century with the West Indies Federation (1958–1962) and the Caribbean Free Trade Area 
(1965), culminating with the establishment of CARICOM in 1973. The formation of the 
Association of Caribbean States (ACS) in 1994 broadened the regional scope, while the 
CARICOM Single Market and Economy, launched in 2006, pushed the regionalism agenda 
in a neoliberal direction (Payne and Sutton 2007). The project of regional integration faced 
challenges prior to China’s rise as a significant economic force in the region. CARICOM 
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engages in a minimalist approach to integration and functions as a community of sovereign 
states based on a model of intergovernmentalism in which member states retain their sov-
ereignty in cooperation arrangements (Grenade 2011). CARICOM also adopts a top-down 
approach to decision-making to the near exclusion of civil society and private sector engage-
ment (Bishop et al. 2011). Moreover, the economic divergences and varying or competing 
interests between member states also cause problems for foreign policy coordination (Girvan 
2011; Grenade 2011).
China’s mode of engagement has further fractured the regional project. The PRC has 
promoted a number of forums with diverse regional foci, but these exclude some CARICOM 
members. Caribbean leaders have participated in some of these, such as the Belt and Road 
Forum for International Cooperation, the CELAC–China Summit, and the China/Caribbean 
Economic and Trade Cooperation Forum. Excluding the latter, the role reserved for Caribbean 
states is nominal. Also, despite facilitating socialisation, these forums are invariably focussed 
on ‘generating good will and prestige for Beijing, despite the fact that the overwhelming 
content of relations […] still flow through bilateral channels’ (Alden and Alves 2017; see also 
Tudoroiu and Ramlogan 2020a). There is, in short, little substance beyond vague pledges 
towards the broader region that only materialise in bilateral negotiations. The forums are 
also notorious for their exclusion of civil society. CARICOM should remain in this sense the 
prime forum for regional cooperation in the relation with China. However, CARICOM’s inter-
ests are often ‘compromised as it attempts to coordinate and leverage such a large number 
of players with competing interests’, something that has been exacerbated by the One China 
Policy (Montoute 2015, 7). Given that a number of members (Belize, Haiti, Saint Kitts and 
Nevis, Saint Lucia and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines) do not hold formal diplomatic 
relations with the PRC, China’s diplomacy bypasses CARICOM.
China’s preference for bilateral engagement has also encouraged competition rather than 
collaboration for Chinese development cooperation (Montoute 2013). In this regard, the 
prospect of CARICOM’s leveraging the Belt and Road Initiative for regional connectivity looks 
dim, and it has instead fomented race-to-the-bottom competition among member countries 
to host some of China’s projected infrastructures. These include, for example, a much-de-
bated deep-water port to facilitate the distribution of container cargo throughout the region. 
Thus, China’s approach has empowered central government elites through bilateral dealings 
while closing off spaces for supranational regulation and bottom-up civil society participa-
tion (Gonzalez-Vicente 2015). Combined with CARICOM’s own shortcomings, China’s growing 
role in the region is bound to make the possibility for effective regional cooperation an even 
more distant prospect.
The postcolonial condition
So far, we have used the three broad themes above to unpack perennial questions in the 
relation between the Caribbean and the global economy, and to offer analytical insights 
into the region’s contemporary relations with China. In this last section we use the broad 
theme of the ‘postcolonial condition’ to address the internal sociological makeup of the 
Caribbean region as evolved from former plantation economies and into their current hybrid 
selves. In particular, we want to clarify that the Caribbean is not only ‘impacted’ by China, 
but that there exists a dialectical tension between the Caribbean’s pre-existing social con-
figurations and its shifting international linkages, particularly regarding questions of class 
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relations, racial and gender dynamics, state configuration, and the co-constitution of national 
identities and modernity imaginaries. Therefore, Chinese businesses in the region are not 
only external vectors of change, but become local actors subject to transformation in the 
context of Caribbean social relations and agency.
A first example can be found in the ill-fated investments of Complant International in 
the sugar sector in Jamaica. Complant arrived in Jamaica in 2010, acquiring three factories 
and leasing around 18,000 hectares in the south of the island for a period of 49 years. The 
ambitious plan to reduce operation costs by 30% and boost productivity did not yield the 
expected outcomes despite drastic cuts in the labour force (Minto 2019b). Chinese entre-
preneurs have blamed their poor performance on questions of low productivity and cultural 
barriers for communication (Jamaica Gleaner 2017). However, what is missing in this analysis 
is an in-depth understanding of the socio-political complexity of the sector in its Jamaican 
context. The decline of productivity in the sugar sector following independence was met 
by Prime Minister Michael Manley with a commitment to full employment as a form of 
social justice (Manley 1974, 90). Building on this sensibility and electoral politics, the sector 
developed orientated towards livelihood provision through political party-centred clien-
telistic networks with weak regulations and incentives, rather than towards global com-
petitiveness (Drori and Gayle 1990; Northover 2001). Sugar, of course, also occupies a 
complex position in the region’s historical memory, being at the same time central to its 
culture and economic organisation and symbolic of severe labour exploitation in the plan-
tation economies. In such a context, attempts to boost productivity such as the Chinese-led 
ones were necessarily in tension with local models of subsistence and sociocultural 
expectations.
However, pre-existing social structures do not necessarily act so as to block the advance 
of Chinese capital. In certain situations, they can actually facilitate it. Our second example is 
one of electoral politics. In Trinidad and Tobago, very much like Guyana, racial divisions 
translate into ethnic voting patterns. While the exact definition of and attitudes towards 
ethnic difference have shifted through time (Abraham 2001), today there are in Trinidad two 
major parties, one of them (the People’s National Movement – PNM) having a majority Afro-
Trinidadian electorate, and the other (the United National Congress – UNC) supported mostly 
by Indo-Trinidadians. In this context, the National Academy of Performing Arts was inaugu-
rated in 2009 as the flagship project of Prime Minister Patrick Manning’s (PNM) dealings with 
China. The project, constructed by the Shanghai Construction Group (SCG), was not exempt 
from controversies, on issues such as flaws in its original design, significant cost overruns, 
potential embezzlement, and the need to close down the building six years after its inaugu-
ration for major repairs (Oosterveld, Wilms, and Kertysova 2018). Despite delivering severe 
critiques while in the opposition, Kamla Persad-Bissessar’s administration (UNC, 2010–2015) 
would continue with the construction of a similar facility, the Southern Academy of 
Performing Arts (SAPA), also built by the SCG and completed in 2012. SAPA is located in the 
city of San Fernando, and the priority given by the UNC to this facility during their years in 
power has been associated with the complex geographical voting and ethnic patterns in 
Trinidad, with many UNC votes concentrated in the central plains since the 1960s 
(Premdas 2004).
In sum, electoral politics pushed both major parties to rely on Chinese loans and corpo-
rations to augment their infrastructural legacies. Meanwhile, the Artists Coalition of Trinidad 
and Tobago protested the failure to consult local artists. Fundamentally challenging the 
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Chinese infrastructure-based development approach, they reminded their country’s leaders 
that ‘development is not about buildings. It is about people; the energy of the people’ (quoted 
in Newsday 2010).
Conclusion
CCDT offers invaluable insights into the analysis and theorisation of Chinese capital in the 
Caribbean. Decades ago, regional scholars developed theories and analytical insights on 
epistemic dependency, passive incorporation, regional integration and postcolonial devel-
opment that are still relevant today, and which remain pertinent for understanding the 
region’s contemporary relationship with China. Perhaps less evident is the fact that at least 
two of these theories – epistemic dependency and passive incorporation – can also shed 
light on the dynamics of China’s Belt and Road Initiative beyond the Caribbean. As the 
Chinese government invites its counterparts to join the Belt and Road Initiative and Chinese 
capital penetrates new markets, large swaths of the developing world are being passively 
integrated into the Chinese government’s global vision and into the world market, often 
exacerbating structural constraints and epistemic dependency, and in the process hindering 
bottom-up processes of emancipatory development.
The exercise we have conducted demonstrates the possibility of constructing a truly 
‘global’ approach to IR, where knowledges from the Global South are mobilised to theorise, 
analyse and, if necessary, contest processes of planetary relevance. The exercise pursues 
two parallel goals: to challenge geographies of knowledge that have tended to privilege 
‘Western’ academic orthodoxy, and to contribute to devolving political agency into regions 
that were for decades subsumed to neoliberal development thought and praxis, and which 
are today tempted by the similarly elitist and business-centric approach of the PRC. With 
this, we are not claiming that research on a given region should necessarily rely on theories 
advanced by local authors (this would be the opposite of a ‘global’ approach). yet a truly 
globalised IR should actively engage the multiple voices and theories from the Global 
South and incorporate them into international debates when, as in this case, they have 
so much to contribute.
Decades ago, Latin American and Caribbean theories of dependency made the leap 
to become central to many debates on development and IR. The key in these theories 
was not that they were ‘Latin’ or ‘Caribbean’, but that they spoke to a universal experience 
of postcolonial capitalism in the Third World. In a similar vein, we hope to have demon-
strated here that CCDT can help to analyse the many challenges and opportunities that 
the region faces in its relationship with China, and indeed to more broadly theorise the 
Belt and Road Initiative as a new mechanism of capitalist accumulation that remains, 
for the time being, unable to provide satisfactory answers to the emancipatory aspira-
tions of the Third World.
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